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CARIBBEAN MIGRATION
AS A STRUCTURAL REALITY
Dialogues # 13
January 1983
By: Anthony P. Maingot
PREFACE
The US Congress' inability to enact recent legislation vitally
affecting the Caribbean suggests the continuing divergence of views
regarding this region which is so important to US interests. In
this Occasional Papers Series Dialogues, Dr. Anthony Maingot,
Professor of Sociology at Florida International University and
Associate Editor of Caribbean Review, examines the structural
realities of Caribbean migration and the likely impact of the much
discussed Caribbean Basin Initiative on migration flows throughout
the Caribbean and the US.
This paper is a revised version which was earlier presented
to the Conference on Caribbean Migration sponsored by Georgetown
University and Greater Miami United at Miami, Florida on December
8, 1982. It alludes to the need for a Caribbean wide meeting
on migration which might begin to harmonize immigration and
emigration laws. In fact, such a gathering is long overdue. It
could serve to establish a region-wide agenda of migration issues,
complementary to and eventually replacing the fitful and unsatis-
factory US initiatives on the issue.
Mark B. Rosenberg
Director
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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 1982 the President of the Dominican Republic,
Salvador Jorge Blanco, cautioned a meeting of U.S. and Caribbean
Statesmen that the "massive" migration out of the Caribbean had
become a "torrent". "The problem the United States faces," he
warned, "is how to decrease their internal protectionist policies,
so that instead of having more legal or illegal Caribbean emigrants,
they should receive more regionally produced goods." President
Jorge noted the incongruity that the costs incurred by the U.S.
in 1980 to lodge and keep illegal Caribbean migrants was twice
the U.S. bilateral assistance to the Dominican Republic that year.(1)
The Dominican President was not the only one to make a case
for increased aid as a means of slowing down migration, legal
and illegal; it is in fact also one of the arguments undergirding
the Reagan Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative.
While there can be no arguments against increased assistance
to the Dominican Republic and the Caribbean and even more urgently
to the removal of barriers to Caribbean exports, there is little
basis to the assumption that doing this will stop migration, in
the Caribbean or elsewhere. The problem is simply too staggering.
It is calculated for instance that the Third World will have to
create some 600 million new jobs over the next twenty years in
order to absorb the young adults entering the labor force.
(1) Speech to Sixth Annual Conference on the Caribbean.
Miami, Florida, December 7, 1982.
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These young adults will represent some 40% of these Third World
populations.(1) The case of Mexico illustrates the trend: with
not quite 1/3 the population of the U.S., it adds in absolute
numbers 2/3 more people to its population every year. Mexico
will need a 6.5% growth rate per year plus a yearly outmigration
of 250,000 just to keep up with the 3.5% growth in the workforce. (2)
One need not belabor the point that the recent crisis in the
Mexican economy leaves no one sanguine about such achievements.
Similarly, the present political turmoil in Central America
is
which/in so many respects a consequence of the structural economic
crisis, will surely increase pressures for migration to the U.S.
With some 400,000 to 500,000 Salvadoreneans already in the U.S.,
American authorities are presently deporting over 1,000 of them
per month. With unemployment rates which vary between 20% in
Costa Rica to 50% in Honduras, these economies appear incapable
jobs
of creating enough/for these unemployed plus the 7 million new
workers who will enter the market by the year 2000. As the
Environmental Fund put it, in Central America "the potential
migrants to the U.S. through the rest of this century are already
born." But population pressures are not the only reasons for
a desire to migrate. This fact is illustrated by the case of Cuba,
the only Caribbean Basin society presently experiencing a downward
(1) Citedly Richard E. Benedick, Coordinator of Population Affairs,
U.S.S.D. before "Houston Media" Roundtable, 10/23/81.
(2) William P. Butz et. al., Demographic Challenges in America's
Future, (Santa Monica, Calif., Rand, May 1982) p. 24.
(3) T.E.F. Data, September 1982, p. 2.
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trend in fertility. It is evident that the factors causing
that downward trend are the same ones which tend to "push"
outmigration: the poor performance of the economy and the
disappointment of expectations. (1)
These are only some of the more global or macrosociological
facts, which make it appear that the expectation that a foreign
assistance package such as the CBI will bring about radical
shifts in pressures to migrate is misplaced. There are other
reasons for scepticism.
It is the theme of this presentation that the demographic
and economic conditions in the Caribbean region combine with a
set of social and historical factors to create a situation of
migration best called "structural" as distinct from time or
event-fixed. The direction of the flow might shift occasionally,
the magnitude might vary but the pressures are constant and the
movement will be constant until such pressures subside. Because
it is driven by both material forces (geography, demography and
economics) and because it is now an integral part of Caribbean
consciousness, high rates of migration will most probably continue
into the near future.(2)
Given this reality plus the apparent inability of the U.S.
(1) Cf. Sergio Diaz-Briquets and Lizandro Perez, "Socio-Economic
Factors in Cuba's Fertility Decline", in Population and
Development Review, Vol. 8 (September 1982), Pp. 513-37.
(2) Cf. Mary M. Kritz' discussion of the "complex and intricate
pattern" of intraregional migration in Kritz, Charles B. Veely
and Silvano M. Tomasini (ed.), Global Trends in Migration
(N.Y. Center for Migration Studies, 1981), Pp. 208-233.
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to implement existing immigration legislation or enact new ones,(
it seems reasonable to look at the factors which led to this
condition of structural migration. The analysis here is limited
to legal migration which gives us more accurate figures as
well as a window onto official policy. It is fair to assume,
however, that where the pressures for legal migration are great
so are the pressures for illegal movements.
II. CARIBBEAN MIGRATION: FIVE STRUCTURAL FEATURES
It is calculated that during the late 1970's and early
1980's some 80% of all immigrants to the U.S. came from Latin
America and Asia. Proportionally, however, the nations of the
Caribbean Basin provided the largest share. Korea, with 41
million people sent 29,248 immigrants to the U.S. in 1979; the
nations of the Caribbean (excluding Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela,
and Colombia) represent 39 million people but sent 92,000 legal
immigrants to the U.S. that same year. Korea sent 711 per
million and the average for Europe was 125 per million while for
the Caribbean it was 1150 per million.
Further, in the Caribbean it is the island state which
has been sending the highest number of immigrants to the U.S.,
to wit:
(1) The theme of this essay is premised on the assumption that
the U.S. will remain a pluralist, civilian democracy in which
the militarization of the borders or the curtailment of due
process would be unthinkable.
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Country Population Immigrants #Per Mil. Pop.
Barbados .3 million 2,461 8,203/million
Dominican
Republic 5.7 million 17,519 3 ,078/million
Haiti 6.1 million 6,433 1,054/million
Jamaica 2.2 million 19,714 8 ,960/million
Trinidad/
Tobago 1.1 million 5,225 4 ,750/million
While the European share of total immigrants went from 59%
in 1951-60 to 19% in 1971-80, the West Indian share climbed
from 5% to 18%. The Haitian share went up from 0.7% in 1957-61
to 3.6% in 1967-71 and 3% in 1972-76.
Clearly and evidently, the more viscious aspects of the racial
bias which characterized so much of U.S. immigration policy up to
1965, have abated visibly while other less desirable legacies
also appear to be in fast retreat today.
It is good to remember, however, that despite this past racial
bias and despite the fact that the numbers of Caribbean people
arriving now are greater, the movement has a long history. It
takes time for any such movement to assume the structural features
which Caribbean migration has today. We can identify five
important dimensions to that structural reality which are best
characterised as giving shape to a "pull" syndrome.
1. The self-contained geographical space which is the
Caribbean. No major mountain barriers nor unmanageable bodies of
water separate potential migrants from their destinies. Even the
Caribbean Sea flows like a river from South to North as does the
constant winds which are part of this stream; when and where
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Caribbean man could not walk to his destination he rowed or sailed
to it. He still does as the truly fantastic trek of the Haitian
sailboat from that Island through the Bahamas to Florida
demonstrates.
2. The movement to the U.S. tended to be preceded by
earlier moves, very often to sites of U.S. financed or managed
job opportunities. For instance, the building of the Panama Canal
drew large numbers of West Indians to that site. Just from
Barbados, 20,000 men were recruited, which was 10% of the
island population and 40% of all adult males.(1) But as David
McCullough writes, "... for every man who was picked to go to
Panama"there were five or more others eager for the chance."(2)
From Panama they moved to work in banana plantations and build
railroads in the rest of Central America. West Indians also
worked on U.S. owned plantations in Cuba and the Dominican
Republic. (3) Today these English-speaking Central Americans are
moving to the U.S.
This historical experience of West Indians with migration
and with U.S. capital and business abroad created two additional
characteristics critical to a "structural" condition of
migration:
(1) By the 1970's Barbados' Crude Emigration Rate (emigration as
a percent of native born inhabitants to just the U.S.A. and
Canada continued to be 10.5% despite a zero population growth
rate.
(2) The Path Between the Seas (New York; Simon and Schuster, 1977),
p. 475.
(3) Jose'del Castillo found that British West Indians were second
only to Haitians in the Dominican sugar estates in the 1920's
(La inmigracidn de braceros... 1900-1930. Santo Domingo:
Cuadernos del ENDIA, No. 7).
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(a) An attitude that migrating was the best avenue for
success and that exercising such an option was a "right". There
was group approval for individual decisions to migrate and group
expectations about remittances and future sponsorships of others.
(b) The necessary social-cultural enclaves, those social
networks which attracted others and facilitated their entry and
success were built either directly in the U.S. or in the
intermediate, U.S.-controlled areas in the Caribbean. As important
as these "stepping stones" migrations to the U.S. were, there was
of course a significant direct movement from the West Indies to
the U.S. and this, despite the racially-biased immigration system in
operation in the 1900-10 period. During that decade 30,000
arrived; in 1910-20, some 60,000; and during the 1920's some
40,000. By 1930 West Indian blacks were about 1% of the U.S.
black population and about 25% of the population of Harlem.
The presence of such a "critical mass" was both cause and
effect of the third feature of Caribbean migration.
3. The successful assimilation of Caribbean man. Thomas
Sowell notes that as early as 1901, West Indians owned 20% of
the Black businesses in Manhattan, were represented beyond their
numbers in the professions, while second generation West Indians
have higher incomes than U.S. blacks and whites and have below
average unemployment rates. They also have lower rates of
fertility and crime than either black or white Americans.
Sowell's explaination that "West Indians were much more frugal,
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hard-working and entrepreneurial", and that, "their children
worked harder and out-performed native black children in school,"(1)
describes many other immigrant groups.
They certainly also illustrate the success of more recent
Caribbean migrants: Cubans and Haitians. These success stories,
then act as powerful incentives to their countryman to move to
the U.S.A. also.
4. A final structural characteristic of Caribbean
movements has to do with the continuing role in international
relations of ethnicity both in official policy as well as in
what is today known as transnational forces, i.e., forces which
operate independent from official or governmental actions.
This is one of the most difficult areas to analyze because
while we are dealing with attitudes and perceptions as realities
on the one hand there can be no doubt that official policy
formulation also continues to be important. It is evident for
instance that the 1965 changes in immigration law were strongly
influenced by the ideas of Lynden Johnson's Great Society which
in turn had been influenced by the civil rights movement.
American blacks made the linkage between their gains in civil
rights with the rights of foreign blacks to equal access to U.S.
residence through immigration reform. This tendency to linkage
(1) Ethnic America (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 219.
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continues and has generated renewed awareness of two critical
roles played by ethnicity.
(a) The first is in internal U.S. politics. Caribbean
migrants (both black and white) have been quick to recognize
that while the "immigration problem" is a secular one in this
society, the race and ethnic problem is very much also a moral
problem. Even before they become citizens they learn the value
of ethnic bargaining and have made great strides through the
use of the mechanisms created by U.S. laws generally and Civil
Rights movement specifically.(1)
(b) The second demonstrates the link between foreign policy
and immigration policy. Once Fidel Castro decided that Cuba was
an "Afro-Latin" nation and began to use race in international
politics--the linkages with South Africa and other racially-tense
areas logically make U.S. foreign policy towards the Caribbean
sensitive to the race issue.
The point is, of course, that as Table No. 1 demonstrates,
the Caribbean Basin is predominantly black or mixed. Race and
ethnicity will continue to play an important role in inter-
national politics and therefore also in U.S. thinking and actions
on immigration policy.
(1) Cf. Anthony P. Maingot, "Ethnic Bargaining and the Non-
Citizen: Haitians and Cubans in Miami", Report to the U.S.
Coordinator of Refugee Affairs, Miami, Florida, 1981; also
by Maingot on this subject, "Ideology, Politics, and Citizenship
in the American Debate on Immigration Policy: Beyond Consensus,"
in Mary M. Kritz (ed.), U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy,
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath & Co., 1982)
Pp. 361-379.
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TABLE No. 1
The racial structure of the population of the Caribbean
islands, 1960*
Caribbean Islands Greater Lesser(total) Antilles Antille Bahamas
1000 % 1000 % 1000 % 1000 %
Whites 7800 39-6 7700 44.6 80 3-4 23 20
Negroes 7800 39-6 6000 34-8 1720 73.2 90 80
Mulattoes 3 670 18-6 3550 20.6 120 5.1 - -
Asian Indians 350 1.8 - - 350 14-9 - -
Indians and
Mestizos 80 0-4 - - 80 34 - -
Total 19700 100-0 17250 100-0 2350 100.0 113 100
*approximate figures
Source: Helmut Blume, The Caribbean Islands, (London:
Longman Group Ltd., 1974).
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5. The fifth and final characteristic is less permanent
than the previous four but appears to have become enough of a
part of U.S. thinking on immigration to be considered structural.
We refer here to the fact that both law and sentiment seem
to provide strong and enduring support to the principle of
family reunification as one of the centerpieces of immigration
law. The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy
appointed by President Carter recommended in 1980 that "the
reunification of families continue to play a major and
important role in U.S. immigration policy." Similarly the ill-
fated Simpson-Massoli Bill of 1982 retained this principle of
family reunification eventhough it established a zero-sum
situation between different groups of relatives ("preferences").
Be that as it may, the fact is this principle of family
reunification takes on a mathematical dimension when we observe
that, as Tables No. 1, A and B demonstrate, the number of Caribbean
people already in the legal immigration pipeline is substantial:
438,841 in all seven preference categories. Again, we note the
demand from the islands by observing that the Hispanic
Caribbean with 32 times more population than the Insular
Caribbean has less than 5 times the active visa applicants. By
checking the meaning of each preference in Appendix "A" and noting
the numbers in Tables No. 1 (A) and (B) you note the
significance of second and fifth preferences, indications of the
strength of both the immediate and extended Caribbean family
systems. These strengths become part of the "structure" through
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its contribution to their networks, their success and their
sense of "right" to migrate.(1)
These five features, therefore, are parts of a "pull"
syndrome: they mutually reinforce each other, gaining
strength as they interact over time.
To this point the argument has dealt with only one half of
any migration equation: the "pull" of the targetted area of
settlement. One has to deal with the central idea behind the
CBI intended which was to sufficiently improve
conditions in the sending countries so as to mitigate the
pressure of the "push" factors. As it turns out, however, a set
of forces are operating in these sending countries which are
structural and not of easy solution.
THE STRUCTURE OF CARIBBEAN "PUSH" FACTORS
In his fundamentally influential 1950 treatese on economic
development in the West Indies, W. Arthur Lewis made the
assertion that "the case for rapid industrialization in the West
Indies rests chiefly on over-population." Agriculture could not
do it: industrialization in manufacturing was the answer but,
even this, only partly so;as Lewis understood it: "There are
two other principal opportunities, namely the development of
the tourist industry, and emigration." (2)
(1) It is interesting to see the spirited W.I. defence of the H-2
Program in operation since 1942 and which today I hires
some 16,000 British West Indians. It is generally regarded
as "legitimately" a West Indian program just as Mexicans
regard movement to the U.S.A. as historically legitimate.
(2) "The Industrialization of the British West Indies", Caribbean
Economic Review, II (May 1950). Sir Arthur Lewis was awarded
the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1980.
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Even before Lewis treatise and certainty after it, the
assumption of continued and uninterrupted high rates of migration
had become an integral part of West Indian thinking and planning
on economic development. The Barbados Development Plan, 1979-
1983, for instance, makes projections for population and
employment based-on three assumptions: a stable pattern of
mortality, a marginal decline in fertility and "a continuation
of the level of emigration experienced in the post censal
period..." And as Arthur Lewis had theorized three decades
so
earlier,/the Barbadians also project that while the level of
employment in agriculture would remain static, there was to be
some increase in agricultural productivity. The real growth
would be in manufacturing, expected to grow by 4.9%, and services
(government and tourist), expected to grow by 5%.
The problem is that neither in Barbados -- where fertility
rates have been dropping -- nor in the rest of the Caribbean --
where they have not -- are things working out the way they were
supposed to. Table No. 4 shows that, as Lewis predicted,
agriculture has not been able to absorb new labor but that,
unlike what he predicted, its productivity has also been
dropping.
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Table No. 4
AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT,SELECTED TERRITORIES, 1960 AND 1970(percentage of total)
1960 1970
Terrtory Employment Otput Employment Output
Barbados 26 28 16 14Guyana 37 26 29 19Jamaica 39 12 29 8Trinidad and Tobago 21 12 16 S
ICCM 46 36 32 22
Source: The World Bank, The Commonwealth Caribbean
(John Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 119.
That land hunger or scarcity is not the central problem can
be seen from the case of Guyana or indeed Trinidad where the
government holds large tracts of "crown lands". The move away
from the land results from very complex forces which have yet to
be fully analyzed in the region. It is, however, a reality that
every country in the Caribbean is today so heavily dependent on
food imports that as President Jorge Blanco put it, "It can
hardly be imagined what would happen if no food from abroad would
reach the Caribbean for only two months."
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But the Caribbean crisis has an even more complex dimension:
while natives abandon agriculture to migrate to cities or abroad
they are partly subsituted by migrants from less developed
areas. These migrants, many of them illegals, work both in
subsistence and truck farming as well as in large scale export
crop agriculture. Haitians now constitute 90% of the labor in
Dominican sugar and 30% of that country's coffee work force.
Colombians stream over the border into Venezuela replacing
(1)Venezuelans who move to the cities,) Eastern Caribbean "small
islanders" in Barbados and to some extent in Trinidad. The
experience has been that these same migrants soon become
candidates for another migratory step -- to the U.S. This
certainly has been the case with the Haitians who moved to the
(2)Bahamas  and the Leeward Islanders who move to the U.S. Virgin
Islands. This last case provides an especially vivid picture of
the dimensions of the population movements in the area: in 1970
it was calculated that 37.9% of the population of the U.S.V.I.
had moved to the U.S. mainland and Canada while the percentage
of foreign born residents in those islands was 34.1%. The U.S.T.I.
has become a "transhipment" station, and so have other islands.
It is good to remember, thus, that while the U.S.A. remains
the first choice of Caribbean migrants it is not the only one.
(1) On this score see the excellent work of S. Sassen-Koob,
"Economic Growth and Immigration in Venezuela", in M. M. Kritz
and D.T. Gurak (eds.), International Migration Patterns in
Latin America, International Migration Review (Fall 1979),
Pp. 455-474.
(2) Cf. Dawn Marshall, The Haitian Problem: Illegal Migration to
the Bahamas (Mona, Jamaica: ISER, 1978).
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The phenomenon is regional and so is the concern and action
directed at it. The case of Trinidad and Tobago illustrates
this point.
III. TRINIDAD AS SENDER AND RECEIVER
The case of Trinidad and Tobago illustrates better than most
the terrible predicament these islands confront in the 1980's.
It also demonstrates what has become a region-wide phenomenon:
the efforts made to keep in-migration to a minimum even as its
own out-migration increases.
Trinidad did not enact an immigration ordinance until 1936
and that ordinance -- of very limited reach -- remained the only
legislation in this area until the 1969 Immigration Act. This
legislative inaction, however, did not mean that there had been
no concern over illegal immigration; it simply was not a major
issue. This changed in the late 1950's and early 1960's during
the period of the West Indies Federation, a Federation which did
not include provisions for free movement of labor. It hardly
mattered. The government of Trinidad and Tobago noted in 1960
that the expectations of an open door into the island were
widespread and had created pressures which were "formidable and
intolerable..." and concluded that "the answer is planned
migration."(1)
(1) Government of Trinidad-Tobago, Economic Development of the
Independent, W.I. Fed., P.O.S. Office of the Premier,
October 1960, p. 11.
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It was clear then that one of the major barriers to any form
of association in the West Indies was fear of the free movement
of labor. Even associations of much more limited scope such as
the long discussed idea of the formation of a unitary state with
the neighboring island of Grenada was rejected partly because of
the fear of an increase of Grenadian migration into Trinidad.(1)
The fact remained, however, that with or without Federation
or with or without a unitary state political arrangement, illegal
migration from the Eastern Caribbean continued into Trinidad.
Between January 1958 and November 1959, 75% of the 10,135 visitors
from these islands overstayed their permits and disappeared into
the large resident, illegal populations in Trinidad. Such was
the magnitude of the movement that in 1957 migrants from Grenada
represented 6% and those from St. Vincent 4.3% of Trinidad's
population.(2) In fact, by the mid 1970's the Trinidad
government regarded the problem as so acute that an important
Task Force recommended a Caribbean-wide harmonization of the laws
pertaining to immigration and emigration. It also recommended
such measures as identity cards and prosecution of those hiring
illegal aliens, (3 ) anticipating similar recommendations in the
U.S.A. by eight years thus.
(1) Trinidad-Tobago: Report of the Economic Commission,
January 1965, Pp. 35-40.
(2) Trinidad-Tobago: Report of the Caribbean Task Force. P.O.S.,
February 1974, Pp. 90-95.
(3) Ibid, p. 96.
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There was, and is, reason for Trinidad officials to worry.
Despite continued 5-year plan projections of full employment,
unemployment since 1965 grew at roughly 4 per cent per year
while new job slots increased by 1.4% per year. Should this
rate continue, it is projected that by 1985 there will be some
100,000 unemployed or 20.4% of the 1985 labor force,(1 ) despite
the fact that this figure includes a 6,895 per year exit from
the labor force through out-migration.
This dismal panorama has been changed very little by the
enormous investment of petrodollars to industrialize the Island's
Although
economy./very much on the lines recommended by Arthur Lewis in
1950, the results of these efforts have not been encouraging
for the longer run. The IMF recently reported that of a total
of TT$11.5 billion in surplus revenues deposited in the
Development Fund between 1974 and 1981, TT$8.6 billion have been
disbursed in the attempt to convert the island into a major
energy-based industrial country.
Despite these major efforts to reduce unemployment and
despite a dip in joblessness in 1981 and 1982, there does not
appear to be any long-range prospects that the trend has been
reversed. Migration, as one would expect, is on the increase,
especially it appears among skilled workers and professionals.
(1) Cf. Trevor M. A. Farrell, "The Unemployment Crisis in
Trinidad-Tobago", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 27,
No. 2 (June 1978), Pp. 117-152.
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In the 1970's between 60 and 70% of these emigrants were
professionals, managers, and skilled workers. During 1962 and
1968, Trinidad lost 143 doctors and dentists, 170 engineers,
629 nurses, 784 teachers and 909 other professionals -- in their
majority in the productive 20 to 34 age group.(1)
It is calculated that the English-speaking Caribbean is
losing some 14,000 skilled personnel per year.(2) A review of
the figures in Tables No. 2 and 3 indicates that proportionate
to population West Indians apply under Preference Six in greater
numbers than those from the Hispanic Caribbean. Facilities with
English and a better level of public education partly account
for this but in general, it is an integral part of the historical
structure of Caribbean population movements.
created
The frustrations/by this movement even after such heavy
investments in the economy were clearly evident in the last
presentation made by the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago
before his Party's Annual Congress. Noting the massive loss
of skilled personnel and professionals he described the general
picture: (3)
(1) Trinidad-Tobago: The Emigration of Professions, Supervisory,
Middle Level and Skilled Man-Power from Trinidad-Tobago,
1962-1968. P.O.S., 1970.
(2) Reoort... Caribbean Task Force, 1974, p. 91.
(3) Forged from the Love of Liberty. Selected Speeches of Dr. Eric
Williams. Port-of-Spain: Longman, 1981, p. 443.
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In the British Caribbean it has been estimated that the
annual average rate of emigration in relation to the
actual increase in the population was as follows in the
decade of the sixties: Jamaica, 55%, Trinidad and Tobago,
53%, Barbados, 87%, St. Lucia, 53%, St. Vincent, Grenada
and Dominica, well over 70%; St. Kitts-Nevis, 142%,
Montserrat, 124%.
Williams then concluded by lamenting that "there will soon
be no West Indians left in the Caribbean" . .. more an expression
of his frustration than a statement of reality given the rate
of population growth.
CONCLUSION
The ill-fated Caribbean Basin Initiative was clearly one of
the most far-reaching initiatives towards the Caribbean ever
attempted by a U.S. administration. Measures such as the CBI
deserve to be supported on the merits of their trade and
investment incentives which will surely benefit the area. They
are not, and cannot be, a cure for the pressures towards out-
migration in the area. To advocate their implementation on
those grounds might make good sense politically given the U.S.
population's mood regarding immigration, it is not good
sociology as existing experiences in the area demonstrate.
The remarkably successful Haitian industrialization
initiative -- now 20 years old -- has managed to employ a total
of 60,000 workers in textile, electronics and sports assembly
factories. This is less than half the 140,000 annual new
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additions to the population. But even if the U.S. admitted
140,000 Haitians per year this will still leave the island over
populated and impoverished.
The case of Haiti, like that of Trinidad and so many other
islands in the Caribbean, illustrates several aspects of the
area's reality:
1. The industrialization programs launched in the late
1950's to absorb the excess of population has not
stopped migration; it has tended to change its
complexion making it more professional and skilled
worker;
2. Migrants from lesser developed areas move into the
rural sectors, replacing the existing natives: "small
islanders" in Barbados and Trinidad, Haitians into
Dominican Republic.
3. Caribbean states are becoming increasingly self-conscious
about their porous borders while also more concerned
with keeping the U.S. door open as they deal with
unemployment.
It is apparent that even open doors (whether they be in the
Dominican Republic, Trinidad, or the USA) will not solve the basic
problems of development and underdevelopment in the area. Migration,
however, is a reality and one which generally has been beneficial to
both receiving and sending societies. Given the overall level of
concern about it among all governments in the region, it appears
that a Caribbean-wide set of understandings on migration and
immigration is long overdue.
APPENDIX "A"
First Preference Unmarried sons and daughters of
U.S. citizens (20%)
Second Preference Spouses and unmarried sons and
daughters of permanent resident
aliens (20%)
Third Preference Members of the professions,
scientists and artists (10%)
Fourth Preference Married sons and daughters of
U.S. citizens (10%)
Fifth Preference Brothers and sisters of U.S.
citizens (24%)
Sixth Preference Skilled or unskilled workers
needed in the United States (10%)
Seventh Preference Conditional entrants (Refugees)
fleeing communism or an area of
the Middle East (6%)
Non-Preference Other qualified immigrants as visa
numbers are not required for
applicants in the seven
preferences.
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